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Zusammenfassung* 
Das Diskussionspapier befasst sich auf einer teils abstrakten, teils exemplarischen Ebene 
mit methodischen Fragestellungen im Zusammenhang mit der personellen Einkommensver-
teilung, um diesbezügliche Grundzusammenhänge offenzulegen, welche dann in einer spä-
teren Arbeit empirisch näher untersucht werden könnten. Es wird ein dekomponierbarer Un-
gleichheitsindikator aus der Klasse der Generalisierten-Entropie-Indikatoren – der normierte 
Variationskoeffizient – zugrunde gelegt. Auf dieser Basis werden vor allem die Ungleich-
heitseinflüsse von Äquivalenzrelationen diskutiert. Hierbei wird in einkommensunabhängige 
und einkommensabhängige Äquivalenzrelationen unterschieden. 
 
 
Summary* 
The discussion paper deals on a partly abstract, partly exemplary level with methodical is-
sues in the context of the personal income distribution in order to reveal fundamental con-
nections which might be analyzed empirically in a later paper. We will use a decomposable 
inequality indicator out of the class of Generalized Entropy indicators – the normalized coeffi-
cient of variation. On this basis the impacts on inequality, which primarily equivalence rela-
tions have, will be discussed. At this, it will be distinguished between income-independent 
and income-dependent equivalence relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Dr. Jürgen Faik ist Geschäftsführer von FaMa – Neue Frankfurter Sozialforschung. Autoren-Kontakt: 
faik@fama-nfs.de  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of the paper is to consider some methodical settings in analyses of the income dis-
tribution on a rather simple mathematical basis. This shall serve as a mean in order to un-
derstand distributional relations better. The content of the paper follows – at least partly – the 
broad body of literature concerning distributional aspects, which was generated especially in 
the 1980s (and the early 1990s).1 Despite this time lag the corresponding questions are yet 
very important nowadays. 
A very crucial setting in distributional studies is the selection of an equivalence scale. It is – 
to a relatively high degree – a normative decision. So the consequences, following from such 
a decision, matter strongly in distributional studies. It is the main aim of the paper to show 
how distributional results may vary with the possibilities for such a selection. For that purpose 
additively decomposable inequality indicators – like the normalized coefficient of variation – 
are helpful, particularly in order to distinguish within- from between-subgroup effects which 
are caused by the influences of different equivalence scales. 
In order to reach its sketched main aim the paper is structured as follows: In chapter 2 pa-
rameters for distributional sensitivity analyses are considered. After this, in chapter 3 decom-
posable inequality indicators are presented – especially such out of the class of Generalized 
Entropy indicators. Chapter 4 deals with such an indicator, the normalized coefficient of 
variation, and its connection to equivalence relations. We will differentiate between equiva-
lence relations which hold for the whole income range (income-independent equivalence 
relations), and equivalence relations which distinguish between two (or more) sections of the 
whole income range (income-dependent equivalence relations). Some concluding remarks in 
chapter 5 will finish the paper. 
 
 
2. Parameters for distributional sensitivity considerations 
In general, there are a lot of possibilities for dispersing results concerning the personal in-
come distribution due to methodical settings. This includes – in a technical sense – the 
choice of the inequality indicator, the income definition (or more general: the definition of the 
used well-being indicator2), the selection of the unit of analysis, the length of accounting peri-
ods, and the standardizations in consequence of different household sizes and structures.3 
The characteristics of these variables depend, to some extent, on the concrete issue of re-
search because there are a lot of thinkable specifications of the term “income distribution”. In 
this context Faik has distinguished the following (general) distributions in the field of personal 
income distribution:4 
 Primal versus secondary distribution, 
 between- versus within-group distribution, 
 between- versus within-generations distribution, 
 cross-sectional versus longitudinal distribution, and 
 poverty versus richness as margins of the personal distribution. 
                                                            
1 See e. g. the below cited sources Cowell 1980, Shorrocks 1980, Mookherjee/Shorrocks 1982 or Jen-
kins 1991.  
2 Alternatively, wealth and private consumption could be used as alternative well-being indicators (see 
e. g. Faik 1995, pp. 36-39). 
3 See e. g. Hussain 2009. 
4 See Faik 2008, pp. 23-24. 
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So, e. g., in a pre-tax distributional analysis (i. e., in a primal distributional perspective) the 
gross incomes are relevant, whereas in the context of post-tax distributions (i. e., in a secon-
dary distributional perspective) net income is the central (income) variable. Furthermore – to 
give another example –, the choice of the temporal horizon is important for the dimension of 
poverty: Because of possible fluctuations of income during a year a monthly temporal horizon 
tends to overestimate the degree of poverty compared with a yearly perspective in which 
such ups and downs would be smoothed.  
A more or less general parameter for all of the above mentioned distributional specifications 
is an equivalence relation. Such relations are necessary in distributional analyses because 
well-being comparisons between households with different size or (age) structure require a 
standardization of the used well-being indicator. If household income is taken as such an 
indicator, the household incomes have to be transformed to household equivalence incomes 
by dividing the household incomes through so-called equivalence relations. An equivalence 
relation reflects the economies of scales which arise in bigger households, e. g. because of 
price or cost advantages compared with smaller households. Additionally, an equivalence 
relation covers different needs between the household members.5 
In this context demographic changes can influence income inequality. Empirically, the mean 
values for the household size decrease in some developed countries like Germany, and 
there typically exists a positive correlation between household size and household income. 
The development towards more single-person households tends to reduce the mean of 
equivalent incomes because a former common household income of a household with two or 
more persons is now disaggregated into two or more incomes for single-person households 
without the existence of economies of scale (because in single-person households naturally 
there are no economies of scale). That means that there seems to be a tendency for reduc-
ing the measured income inequality ceteris paribus. But in view of the decreasing mean 
household sizes in Germany there could be an oppositional effect concerning the inequality 
of equivalent incomes: The relatively low German fertility rates lead to higher equivalent in-
comes for couples who decide to have no children (so-called “double income no kids”).6 
 
 
3. Decomposable inequality indicators 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
For sensitivity analyses the usage of a decomposable inequality indicator is convenient be-
cause hereby it is possible to investigate within-group and between-group influences of in-
equality. The assumed groups must be disjoint to each other. 
The within-group component measures the weighted sum of the analyzed indicator for the 
different groups. Concerning the between-group component each member of a group is giv-
en the average income of its group.7 
                                                            
5 Basically see Faik 1995, in the context above especially pp. 39-45. 
6 See Peichl/Pestel/Schneider 2009, p. 2. Furthermore, in a more complex view economically based, 
indirectly working effects must be considered, e. g. because of ageing processes. Such an incidence 
analysis requires a more or less detailed economic model (see von Weizsäcker 1988, p. 2). 
7 See e. g. Rodrigues 1993, p. 6. 
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A very popular class of such indicators is the family of Generalized Entropy (GE) measures 
(in which the group’s population shares serve as weighting factors as well as the income 
shares of the groups – as we will see later): 
(1)   
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[GE = General Entropy index,  = parameter with respect to inequality preferences, n = popu-
lation size, Yi = income of person i,  = mean income]. 
The parameter  reflects the social perceptions of inequality. If  is greater than 0, the upper 
income area receives a relatively high weight with respect to inequality; the opposite would 
be the case if  would be less 0. For  = 0 the GE measure represents the mean logarithmic 
deviation, for  = 1 Theil’s measure is the result, and for  =  2 the GE measure corresponds 
to the normalized coefficient of variation. 
GE can be additively decomposed in a within-group and a between-group component of in-
equality, as mentioned above: 
(2)   GEgGE1gw
G
1g g
vGE    
 
                  within-group inequality     between-group inequality 
The weighting factors wg (= ng/n) represent the population shares of the several groups of 
persons g (g = 1, 2, …, G), µg is the mean of incomes within group g, vg (= wg µg/µ) denotes 
the group-specific share of the aggregate income, and GEg symbolizes the within-group GE 
inequality measure and GEB the between-group GE inequality indicator. 
At this, GEB is defined in the following way: 
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1    for  = 1.8 
In the following the three above mentioned GE indicators – the mean logarithmic deviation, 
Theil’s indicator of entropy, and the normalized coefficient of variation – are discussed. This 
discussion includes a detailed definition of each of these indicators as well as a consideration 
concerning the decomposition for each of the three measures. 
 
 
3.2 Mean logarithmic deviation 
3.2.1 Definition 
A good approximation for empirical income distributions, which are typically right-skewed, is 
the log-normal distribution. One of its parameters is the standard deviation of the logarithms 
of income (L1). Because of this, it is not far to seek that this distributional parameter is an 
intuitively plausible indicator for the measurement of income inequality. Its definition is as 
follows:  
(4)  
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[with: L1 = standard deviation of the logarithms of income;  = geometric mean of incomes: 

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ln1ln ]. 
Sometimes L1 is approximated by the logarithmic standard deviation (L2):  
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[with µ as arithmetic mean of incomes].9  
 
A similar measure – compared with L2 – is the mean logarithmic deviation which results in 
the GE family at  = 0 (see formula (1)). In contrast to L2, the latter mentioned measure is not 
based on squared but only on simple deviations of the Yi values from .  
                                                            
8 A more comprehensive consideration of the class of GE measures can be found in Faik 1995, 
pp. 326-330, which is primarily based on Cowell 1980, Shorrocks 1980, Mookherjee/Shorrocks 1982 
and Jenkins 1991. 
9 See Faik 1995, pp. 301-302. 
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3.2.2 Decomposition 
That the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) can be decomposed was demonstrated by 
Mookherjee/Shorrocks.10 Under the prerequisite that the whole population can be differen-
tiated into G disjoint subgroups we obtain: 
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Furthermore, the variation of MLD over time in the sense of the difference between MLD at 
the time periods t+1 and t can be decomposed into four terms (a bar over variables denotes 
the average value of t and t+1 values): 
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Term A reflects the impact of intertemporal changes concerning the within-group inequality, 
term B represents changes in the within-group inequality due to changes in the population 
shares, term C indicates the impact of such changes in the population shares upon the be-
tween-group inequality, and term D characterizes relative changes in the group’s mean in-
comes and their influence upon the overall inequality changes.11 
                                                            
10 See Mookherjee/Shorrocks 1982, pp. 896-897. 
11 See originally Mookherjee/Shorrocks 1982; see Rodrigues 1993, p. 9, or Peichl/Pestel/Schneider 
2009, pp. 7-9, too. In the latter paper an empirical application of the above formula for Germany (on 
the basis of the Socioeconomic Panel) can be found. 
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Summarizing the afore-mentioned characterizations, 
 Term A is an expression for the within-group inequality (generated by differing cha-
racteristics within the groups which are others than the group-constituting characteris-
tics), 
 the terms B and C represent the demographical component of the inequality change, 
and 
 term D reflects the impact of changes in the distribution of average incomes upon the 
several groups.12 
 
 
3.3 Theil’s indicator of entropy 
3.3.1 Definition 
In the context of Theil’s indicator of entropy there exist analogies to the information theory. 
Starting point is the consideration that an event is as much more interestingly, when its prob-
ability of occurrence  is low, e. g. depicted in the following way:  
(8)  h( ) ln . 
1
  
Summing the n single events to an overall event leads to the expected value: 
(9)  H ii
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Equation (9) has its maximum at i = 1/n (for i = 1, 2, …, n); this maximum Hmax is called the 
maximal entropy: 
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In considerations of income inequality the i reflect the income shares 

n
i
i
i
Y
Y
1
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12 See Peichl/Pestel/Schneider 2009, pp. 8-9. 
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If the income shares are distributed entirely equally, so that the income share of each of the 
n units of analysis amounts to 1/n, obviously Hmax is reached. This case should be depicted 
by a value of 0 for the final entropy measure; in order to realize that, the difference between 
the maximal and the actual entropy of the distribution must be computed. In that way Theil’s 
indicator of entropy (T) is defined by:  
(11)  )(H)(max
HT    
i
1
ln
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1i i
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iYln
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1i
iY
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T . 
[with: T = Theil’s indicator of entropy; Hmax() = maximal entropy; H() = entropy of the dis-
tribution]. 
As outlined above, T has its minimal value in the amount of zero (when a uniform distribution 
exists); its maximum value is – in the case of a completely unequal distribution – ln n which 
can be shown in a consideration of limit values (with H equals ln (1) = 0). 
 
3.3.2 Decomposition 
Starting from the final formula of expression (11), i. e. starting from the non-decomposed 
formula of Theil’s measure, we have to distinguish between G subgroups with ng members 
respectively. The corresponding income values within each group g (g = 1, 2, ..., G) are 
named by Yi,g, so that – keeping in mind the symmetry of the ranking of incomes for T – ex-
pression (11) can be transformed to (the bold symbols represent vectors): 
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.13 
                                                            
13 See Shorrocks 1980, p. 613. 
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In the next step the right side of (12) is extended by [(µg ng)/(µg ng)], and the logarithmic 
expression by (µg/µg). Subsequently, some terms are substituted by others, and some ex-
pressions are multiplied out, so that the following results: 
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Considering the group-specific measure of T 
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With the group-specific arithmetic mean 
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last but not least we obtain – after the mathematical operation of cancelling of some expres-
sions – Theil‘s additively decomposed indicator: 
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[with: vg = (ng µg)/(n µ)].
14 
                                                            
14 See Shorrocks 1980, p. 613, too. 
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3.4 Normalized coefficient of variation 
3.4.1 Definition 
An inequality indicator which refers to the first two moments of a distribution, is the coefficient 
of variation (V):15 
(19)  
SV   
[with: V = coefficient of variation, S = standard deviation of incomes,  = arithmetic mean of 
incomes]. 
The so-called normalized coefficient of variation (CV), which – as mentioned above – be-
longs to the class of GE measures (at  = 2), is a simple transformation of (19): 
(20)  2
2S
2
1CV  . 
In the following we will show that CV can be interpreted as a GE measure. In order to reach 
this aim, we specify the above definition of a GE measure (see equation (1)) by fixing  at the 
value of 2: 
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15 See e. g. Faik 2007, pp. 95-96. 
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CVS
2
1S1
2
1GE 2
2
2
2
)2(      (q. e. d.) 
 
3.4.2 Decomposition 
The decomposition of CV in the context of a GE measure can be shown as follows (in a 
backward procedure of computation): 
(22)  
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4. The coefficient of variation and equivalence relations 
4.1 Equivalence relations across the whole income range 
4.1.1 Fundamental connections 
In the context of inequality of equivalent incomes the correlation between household size and 
household income matters. Typically, there is a positive correlation between these two vari-
ables. Starting with the assumption of highest economies of scales and, thus, equivalence 
relations in the amount of 1.0 for all household types, subsequently the degree of economies 
of scales is reduced stepwise corresponding to higher equivalence relations which means a 
levelling concerning the equivalent household incomes. Shortly spoken: The measured in-
equality decreases. But the further dropping of the bigger household’s equivalent incomes 
will lead to an increase in the measured inequality at a certain point. So a u-shaped curve for 
the inequality levels depending on the range of economies of scales is realistic. 
If a negative correlation between household size and household income occurs, it is probable 
that the inequality curve has a positive slope across the whole area or most of the area of 
scale values which begins with the “per household situation” and ends with the “per capita 
situation”. In this case and in an ideal-typical perspective, the relatively low incomes of the 
bigger household sizes – compared with the smaller household sizes – would be reduced 
continuously, and so the inequality between the different household sizes would arise.  
Formally, for CV the influence of equivalence relations on the measured inequality can be 
shown by substituting the household incomes within the g groups (g = 1, 2, ..., G) Yi,g through 
the equivalent incomes within the several groups Yi,g/mg. In order to detect the influence of 
the equivalence relations mg on the measured inequality (by CV), we can decompose the two 
main elements of CV, namely  and S2 (the asterisk denotes equivalent income): 
(23)  

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. 
Whereas the overall values of CV change with variations of the equivalence relations, the 
within-group CVs do not change with diminishing economies of scale. The denominator of 
CVg (the squared arithmetic mean of equivalent incomes within group g) is multiplied by the 
same factor – the inverse of the squared equivalence relation which holds for group g – as 
the nominator of CVg (the variance of equivalent incomes within group g). So, these factors 
will be cancelled by computing CVg, and the within-group CVs remain constantly across the 
range of economies of scale (from “complete economies of scale” up to “no economies of 
scale at all”). This is intuitively plausible because for the within-group distribution of incomes 
equivalence relations do not matter. This is because the underlying units of analysis are ho-
mogenous within the groups (at least concerning the group-constituting characteristics).  
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This can be simply shown in the following way, at first for the denominator of CVg (the 
squared arithmetic mean; the asterisk denotes the fact that the incomes are deflated by 
equivalence relations): 
(24)    2n
1i g
g,i
*
2
g
g
m
Y
n
1



 

  
  2n
1i
g,i2
g
*
2
g
g
Y
n
1
m
1



 

  
  22
g
*
2
g m
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For the numerator of CVg (the variance of equivalent incomes) the mathematical proof is as 
follows: 
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4.1.2 Examples 
The foregoing statements will be illustrated by some examples. In the first example we differ-
entiate between a positive correlation of household size versus (non-adjusted) household 
income on the one hand and a negative correlation of the two stated variables on the other 
hand. The equivalence relations are varied by the formula mg = g in which g marks the 
household size and  denotes in a well-known way the economies of scale.16 
Example 1: 
Household size Household income 
(case A: positive correlation) 
Household income 
(case B: negative correlation) 
1 person 1,000 3,500 
2 persons 2,000 3,000 
3 persons 2,500 2,500 
4 persons 3,000 2,000 
5 persons 3,500 1,000 
It becomes evident, as can be seen in figure 1, that in the case of a positive correlation a u-
shaped function of CV results with a minimum at  = 0.75, whereas in the case of a negative 
correlation a continuously positive slope of the inequality function was generated. These re-
sults exemplify the above statements. 
                                                            
16 The underlying equivalence scale is the so-called Buhmann et al. scale (see Buhmann et al. 1988, 
p. 119). For a comprehensive discussion of this scale see Faik 2009, p. 6. 
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Figure 1: Functional form of the normalized coefficient of variation 
               in dependence of decreasing economies of scale 
               (Buhmann et al. approach; example 1) 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
In the following we will give some further examples in order to check the sensitivity of CV. 
Concretely, for two groups we will vary the following parameters: 
 The relation of the within-group CVs: Equality versus inequality, 
 the population shares, 
 once more the type of the correlation between household size and household income: 
Positive versus negative correlation, and 
 the kind of equivalence relations: Buhmann et al. versus Citro/Michael approach. 
All these simulations are compiled in the following table. 
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Example 2: 
Household type Equiva-
lence  
relation 
Mean 
income 
(in a mone-
tary unit) 
Standard 
deviation 
of incomes 
(in a mone-
tary unit) 
Population 
share 
Normalized 
coefficient of 
variation 
within the 
group 
Example 2A: 
1 person 1.0 1,000 500 0.40 0.125 
2 persons 2.0 1,500 750 0.60 0.125 
Example 2B: 
1 person 1.0 1,000 800 0.40 0.320 
2 persons 2.0 1,500 200 0.60 0.009 
Example 2C: 
1 person 1.0 1,000 200 0.40 0.020 
2 persons 2.0 1,500 1,000 0.60 0.222 
Example 2D: 
1 person 1.0 1,000 500 0.10/.../0.90 0.125 
2 persons 2.0 1,500 750 0.90/.../0.10 0.125 
Example 2E: 
1 person 1.0 1,500 750 0.40 0.125 
2 persons 2.0 1,000 500 0.60 0.125 
Example 2F: 
1 person 1.0 1,000 500 0.40 0.125 
2 persons 1.7 1,500 750 0.60 0.125 
 
The general formula for computing CV in all these simulations is (based on formula (22)): 
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[with: CVI = within-group element of CV; CVII = between-group element of CV]. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates as a starting point for the further sensitivity considerations example 2A in 
which the Buhmann et al. approach for creating equivalence relations is assumed as well as 
a positive correlation between household size and household income. Furthermore, equal 
normalized coefficients of variation within the two groups are used. The assumed relation of 
the population shares between single-person and two-person households is 40 per cent to 
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60 per cent. As a result we obtain the u-shaped inequality curve for the overall coefficient of 
variation. 
 
Figure 2: Functional form of the normalized coefficient of variation (CV) 
               in dependence of decreasing economies of scale for two groups of persons: 
               Positive correlation between household size and household income, 
               equal within-group CVs (Buhmann et al. approach; example 2A) 
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Source: Own illustration 
 
 
Compared with the reference curve presented in figure 2, the variation of the within-group 
CVs in example 2B causes for a higher value of CV within the single-person households than 
within the two-person households a positive slope of the inequality curve (see figure 3); at  
= 0.50 there is a point of intersection with the reference curve in which the same CV values 
between single-person and two-person households were assumed. In contrast, the inequality 
curve caused by example 2C is negatively sloped with a point of intersection with the refer-
ence curve at  = 0.80.17  
In example 2B, when CV1 (i. e., the normalized coefficient of variation for the single-person 
households) is greater than CV2 (i. e., the normalized coefficient of variation for the two-
person households) the first term of CVI in equation (26) has a higher weight (represented by 
CV1) than in example 2A. Furthermore, the overall mean of equivalent income * decreases 
with higher values of the equivalence relations (which mean: with a lower degree of econo-
mies of scale). This has – ceteris paribus – an increasing effect on the overall value of CV 
through an increase of the first terms of CVI and CVII whereas the effect on the second terms 
of CVI and CVII is an opposite one because the diminishing effect through * is counteracted 
through rising equivalence relations for the two-person households only in an under propor-
                                                            
17 By the way, in the examples 2A-2C a variation of the population shares would only change the loca-
tions of the curves but not their forms, as further – here not presented – own simulations have shown. 
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tional way which causes – ceteris paribus – a diminishing effect on measured inequality. The 
latter effect is weighted by a relatively low value of CV2 whereas the first of all stated effects 
– i. e. the increasing inequality due to the first terms of CVI and CVII – has a relatively high 
weight (in the form of CV1). All in all, the last-mentioned effect dominates the other (i. e., the 
opposite) effect so that a positive slope of the inequality curve is the consequence, and the 
overall inequality rises with increasing values of . 
The opposite is the case in example 2C: Here the relevance of the sketched effect of in-
creasing inequality (for single-person households) is weakened by a relatively low value of 
the weight CV1, and the effect of decreasing inequality (for two-person households) is 
strengthened by a relatively high value of the corresponding weight CV2 so that as a conse-
quence the overall inequality decreases with higher values of . 
Figure 3: Functional form of the normalized coefficient of variation (CV) 
               in dependence of decreasing economies of scale for two groups of persons: 
               Positive correlation between household size and household income, 
               equal versus unequal within-group CVs  
               (Buhmann et al. approach; examples 2B and 2C) 
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Source: Own illustration 
 
 
Figure 4 on the next page illustrates example 2D in which the population shares of the com-
pared household types (single-person versus two-person households) are varied. In order to 
show the differences between the different variants distinctly, the ordinate starts with the 
value 0.12. Otherwise – i. e. with a starting value for CV in the amount of zero – it would be 
difficult to detect any differences between the several variants with the naked eye. So, firstly, 
we can register that in our example no big differences between the stated variants exist, and, 
secondly, there is no clear, no systematic ordering of the different variants across the area of 
.  
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Figure 4: Functional form of the normalized coefficient of variation (CV) 
               in dependence of decreasing economies of scale for two groups of persons: 
               Positive correlation between household size and household income, 
               varying population shares (in per cent; Buhmann et al. approach; example 2D) 
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Source: Own illustration 
 
Quasi for the sake of completeness, figure 5 shows the differences between example 2 E 
and example 2A: The results of the above example 1 are qualitatively reflected which is not 
all too much surprisingly. 
 
Figure 5: Functional form of the normalized coefficient of variation (CV) 
               in dependence of decreasing economies of scale for two groups of persons: 
               Positive versus negative correlation between household size 
               and household income (Buhmann et al. approach; example 2E) 
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Source: Own illustration 
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In addition to the preceding examples, in figure 6 the differences between the Buhmann et al. 
and the Citro/Michael approach for constituting equivalence relations are presented. 
Citro/Michael18 have split the Buhmann et al. approach insofar into two parts as they have 
differentiated household size into the number of adults and into the number of children. In our 
example 2F we assume for reasons of simplicity that all two-person households represent 
households consisting of one adult and one child. In this context a child shall be equivalent to 
0.7 adults (i. e. needs for children which are 30 per cent less than that for adults). With this 
specification we obtain until   0.65 slight higher inequality values and from this point lower 
inequality values in the Citro/Michael approach compared with the Buhmann et al. formula. 
As can be seen by formula (26), the influence of the two different equivalence scales was 
partly constituted by the definition of the equivalent income mean * which in our example 
was increased by 
 
2
2
n
n
7.12
7.12 



 in the Citro/Michael case compared with the Buhmann 
et al. case. This causes a diminishing effect with respect to the contributions of the single-
person households in the first terms of CVI and CVII and so ceteris paribus a reduction of CV. 
But this effect is counteracted to some degree by the contributions of the two-person house-
holds in the second terms of CVI and CVII. Although the effect of *, which reduces the in-
equality, exists, too, there is a reverse effect – upon CV through the second terms of CVI and 
CVII – generated by the lower equivalence relations in the Citro/Michael approach compared 
with the Buhmann et al. formula. Obviously, in figure 6 this latter effect dominates the first 
sketched effects of * up to   0.65, and from this point the contrary is the case. 
 
Figure 6: Functional form of the normalized coefficient of variation (CV) 
               in dependence of decreasing economies of scale for two groups of persons: 
               Buhmann et al. versus Citro/Michael approach (example 2F) 
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Source: Own illustration 
                                                            
18 See Citro/Michael 1995, p. 161. See Faik 2009, p. 7, too. 
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4.2 Income-dependent equivalence relations 
There are good reasons for basing distribution analyses on variable equivalence relations. 
E. g., it might be argued that in the higher income ranges the reference consumption levels 
(e. g. concerning living) would be fairly high so that the adding of a new household member 
(e. g. a child) would increase the corresponding costs only marginally, and this would culmi-
nate in low relative costs in the sense of flat equivalence relations for bigger households in 
the upper income range compared with the bottom incomes. Another reason for income-
dependent scales might be that prices of goods can differ across income groups in that way 
that members of the upper income classes obtain price advantages.19 
The estimation of income-dependent equivalence relations is confronted with the initial prob-
lem to separate the upper from the bottom range of equivalent incomes. To do this, means 
that the researcher has to assume concrete equivalence relations for the whole income 
range as a starting point.20 To a high degree this is a normative decision. Faik (1995) or 
Schröder (2004) nevertheless have estimated income-dependent equivalence relations for 
Germany.21 Their results indicate indeed lower equivalence relations in the upper income 
range compared to the bottom income area. 
If we use income-dependent equivalence relations with lower scale values for the upper in-
come class, the differences of the equivalent incomes between the lower and the upper in-
come class become bigger than without using income-dependent equivalence relations. So 
the measured inequality will probably increase. 
Figure 7: Income-independent versus income-dependent equivalence relations 
               and their impact on the income distribution 
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Source: Own illustration 
 
                                                            
19 See Schröder 2004, p. 42. 
20 See Faik 1995, pp. 286-287. 
21 Concerning the estimation of income-dependent equivalence relations see further van Hoa 1986, 
pp. 97-98, or Fiegehen/Lansley/Smith 1977, pp. 105-106. 
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Figure 7 on the previous page compares the case of income-dependent equivalence rela-
tions with the alternative method which uses income-independent equivalence relations. In 
this ideal-typical illustration it becomes evident that for the sketched distributions, which both 
are right-skewed, the arithmetic mean as well as the standard deviation arise for the transi-
tion from income-independent towards income-dependent equivalence relations. Whether 
this corresponds with an increase in the measured inequality depends on the strength each 
of these two increases has. In figure 7 it is assumed – what seems to be realistic – that the 
relative increase of the standard deviation (in per cent) would be higher than the correspond-
ing increase of the arithmetic mean (in per cent, too) so that as a result the measured in-
equality would also rise. 
Formally, we can show the differences between the case with income-dependent equiva-
lence relations and the case with income-independent equivalence relations by decomposing 
the numerator (the variance) as well as the denominator (the squared arithmetic mean) of the 
fraction which the coefficient of variation constitutes. Concretely, the income range is de-
composed in two parts, in the bottom and in the upper income area. 
Firstly, we refer to the squared arithmetic mean (1 represents the bottom income area, and 2 
the upper income area), and we obtain: 
(27)  
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Secondly, we refer to the variance (1 once more represents the bottom income area, and 2 
the upper income area) with the following result: 
(28)  
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Some examples shall illustrate the foregoing connections. 
Example 3: 
Household 
size 
Household 
income 
Equivalence 
relation, 
“first round” 
and 
at the bottom
= square root 
of household 
size 
(rounded) 
Household 
equivalence 
income 
“in the first 
round” 
(rounded) 
Equivalence 
relation, 
at the top= 
square root 
of household 
size * a 
(rounded) 
Household 
equivalence 
income 
“in the 
second 
round” 
(rounded) 
1 person 1,000 1.00 1,000 1.00 1,000 
2 persons 2,000 1.41 1,414 1.41 1,414 
3 persons 2,500 1.73 1,443 1.73 * a 2,500 /  
(1.73 * a) 
4 persons 3,000 2.00 1,500 2.00 * a 3,000 /  
(2.00 * a) 
4 persons 3,500 2.00 1,750 2.00 * a 3,500 /  
(2.00 * a) 
In the first round, a uniform equivalence relation is used in order to differentiate the two in-
come areas from each other. In our example the “square-root scale” was applied. In this case 
an arithmetic mean for the household equivalence scale in the amount of about 1,422 mone-
tary units (MU) and a standard deviation in the amount of circa 242 MU emerge. These val-
ues lead to a normalized coefficient of variation in the amount of approximately 0.0145. 
Concerning the resulting equivalence incomes, the first two households belong to the bottom 
income area because the corresponding values are lower than the computed arithmetic 
mean. Accordingly, the other three households are members of the upper income area. 
Specifying  the parameter a as 0.9 in order to compute the equivalence relations in the upper 
income range, leads to equivalence relations amounting to about 1.56 for the three-person 
household, and 1.8 for both of the four-person households. The equivalent incomes for these 
households add up to approximately 1,604 MU (three-person household), 1,667 MU (first 
four-person household), and 1,944 MU (second four-person household). With these informa-
tions we obtain as “new” arithmetic mean value – in the second round – circa 1,526 MU (+ 7 
per cent compared with the “old” mean in the first round) and as “new” standard deviation 
circa 313 MU (+ 29 per cent compared with the “old” standard deviation), so that the “new” 
normalized coefficient of variations amounts to 0.0211 which is about 46 per cent higher than 
the “old” CV value. Obviously, the CV value increases, as was expected above, and this is 
primarily the result of the increasing covariance between the two income areas.  
Figure 8 shows the sensitivity effects of different values for the parameter a with respect to 
CV. It must be emphasized that the area of lower economies of scale in the upper income 
range at the right of figure 8 has only a mathematical relevance; theoretically, there are no 
plausible arguments for this area in my eyes. Also, not all values on the left are plausible: So 
very low values of the parameter a indicate very high economies of scale in the upper in-
come range which would result in (much) smaller equivalence relations for bigger household 
types in the upper income range compared with smaller household types in the bottom in-
come area; this – at least partly – seems to be not realistic, too. 
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Figure 8: Income-dependent equivalence relations (example 3) with variation 
               of the parameter a 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
In example 3 the “variance effect” overcompensated the increasing value of the arithmetic 
mean at realistic values for the parameter a. In order to show that this effect could notably 
decline, example 4 was created. 
Example 4: 
Household 
size 
Household 
income 
Equivalence 
relation, 
“first round” 
and 
at the bottom
= square root 
of household 
size 
(rounded) 
Household 
equivalence 
income 
“in the first 
round” 
(rounded) 
Equivalence 
relation, 
at the top= 
square root 
of household 
size * a 
(rounded) 
Household 
equivalence 
income 
“in the 
second 
round” 
(rounded) 
1 person 1,100 1.00 1,100 1.00 1,100 
2 persons 1,550 1.41 1,096 1.41 1,096 
3 persons 1,950 1.73 1,126 1.73 * a 1,950 /  
(1.73 * a) 
4 persons 2,250 2.00 1,125 2.00 * a 2,250 /  
(2.00 * a) 
4 persons 2,250 2.00 1,125 2.00 * a 2,250 /  
(2.00 * a) 
 
In example 4 the standard deviation of the equivalence incomes “in the first round” shrinks to 
only circa 14 MU. The value of the arithmetic mean of the equivalence incomes is now about 
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1,114 MU. Once more, the first two households belong to the bottom income area and the 
other three households to the upper income area. In the case of income-independent equiva-
lence relations the normalized coefficient of variation only amounts to 0.00007 now. 
Depending on the variation of the parameter a, CV varies as it is sketched in figure 9. The 
outlined shape of the inequality function is similar to the one presented in figure 8 but in the 
realistic range of values for the parameter a (let us say: from 0.75 to 0.95) the absolute dif-
ferences are much smaller than in example 3 (as a result of the smaller variance in example 
4 compared with example 3): Whereas e. g. in example 3 the difference between the value of 
CV at a = 0.75 und CV at a = 1.00 amounted to 0.0194, in example 4 the corresponding dif-
ference was only 0.0101 (with less CV values in example 4 versus example 3). 
 
Figure 9: Income-dependent equivalence relations (example 4) with variation 
               of the parameter a 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The paper had a rather illustrative character. It dealt primarily with the impact of equivalence 
relations on inequality. After some methodical considerations this impact was evaluated in 
some sensitivity computations. 
In this context we have discussed – on the exemplary basis of the normalized coefficient of 
variation (i. e., the GE measure at  = 2) – the influence of a set of different equivalence rela-
tions with differing economies of scale on inequality. It became evident that the inequality 
curve (of CV) was u-shaped over the range of (decreasing) economies of scale in the case of 
a positive correlation between household size and household income. In the opposite case, 
an extreme negative correlation between household size and household income, the inequa-
lity curve (of CV) was continuously sloped positively. So we obtained hints about the sensiti-
vity of distributional results which were caused by different equivalence relations on the one 
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hand and different correlations between household size and household income on the other 
hand. Careful research on distributional aspects should keep in mind these findings. In my 
eyes it seems to be necessary at least to think about the concrete selection of equivalence 
relations in distributional studies (at least in such concerning income or consumption) in a 
very detailed manner. 
In front of such distributional studies the correlation between household size and household 
income should also be checked (for the reasons stated before). If we e. g. choose for distri-
butional purposes the so-called new and the so-called old OECD equivalence scale, which 
differently deal with economies of scale,22 in the case of a negative correlation between the 
two considered variables another ranking of the measured inequality level might result than 
in the opposite case of a positive correlation between household size and household income. 
Moreover, we have dealt with income-dependent equivalence scales which were separately 
applied in two income areas, in the bottom and in the upper income range. It could be shown 
– once more on an exemplary basis – that for realistic parameters the measured inequality 
was higher than in the case of income-independent equivalence scales. That is – in my eyes 
– a very interesting aspect, because to my knowledge there have been no distributional ap-
plications of income-dependent equivalence relations in Germany until now. But – as was 
considered above – there are very good reasons for introducing this new element into distri-
butional studies! 
All in all, our considerations focused some central distributional aspects which should be ab-
solutely kept in mind in studies concerning the personal income distribution. 
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List of symbols 
  = Parameter with respect to inequality preferences 
  = Arithmetic mean income 
*  = Mean equivalent income 
*,1  = Mean equivalent income in the bottom income range 
*,2  = Mean equivalent income in the upper income range 
1,g  = Mean income in the bottom income range for group g 
2,g  = Mean income in the upper income range for group g 
g  = Mean income within group g 
g*  = Mean equivalent income in group g 
  = Geometric mean of incomes 
  = Probability of occurence of an event 
  = Parameter for economies of scale 
a  = Factor for economies of scales in the upper income range 
                                   compared with the bottom income range 
CV  = Normalized coefficient of variation 
CVI  = Within-group component of CV 
CVII  = Between-group component of CV 
G  = Household size 
GE  = General Entropy index 
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GEB  = Between-group GE inequality measure 
GEg  = Within-group GE inequality measure 
h  = Entropy for occurrence of an event 
H  = Expectancy value for entropy 
i  = Person i 
L1  = Standard deviation of the logarithms of income 
L2  = Logarithmic standard deviation 
m1,g  = Equivalence relation for group g in the bottom income range 
m2,g  = Equivalence relation for group g in the upper income range 
mg  = Equivalence relation for group g 
MLD  = Mean logarithmic deviation 
n  = population size 
n1,g  = Number of persons of group g in the bottom income range 
n2,g  = Number of persons of group g in the upper income range 
ng  = Number of persons in group g 
S2  = Variance of incomes 
S2*  = Variance of equivalent incomes 
S2*,1  = Variance of equivalent incomes in the bottom income range 
S2*,2  = Variance of equivalent incomes in the upper income range 
T  = Theil’s entropy indicator 
Tg  = Theil’s entropy indicator representing within-group inequality 
V  = Coefficient of variation 
vg  = Group-specific share of the aggregate income 
wg  = Population share of group g 
Yi  = Income of person i 
Yi,g  = Income of member i in group g 
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